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Abstract 
Because conventional command-and-control environmental regulation often performs poorly in 
developing countries, policymakers are increasingly experimenting with alternatives, including voluntary 
regulatory programs. Research in industrialized countries suggests that such programs are sometimes 
ineffective because they mainly attract relatively clean participants free-riding on unrelated pollution 
control investments. We use plant-level data on more than 100,000 facilities to analyze the Clean Industry 
Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory initiative. We seek to identify the drivers of 
participation and to determine whether the program improves participants’ environmental performance. 
Using data from the program’s first decade, we find that plants recently fined by environmental regulators 
were more likely to participate, but that after graduating from the program, participants were not fined at 
a substantially lower rate than nonparticipants. These results suggest that although the Clean Industry 
Program attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators, it did not have a large, lasting impact on 
their environmental performance.   
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Voluntary Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries: 
Mexico’s Clean Industry Program 
Allen Blackman, Bidisha Lahiri, William Pizer, Marisol Rivera Planter,  
and Carlos Muñoz Piña∗ 
1. Introduction 
The conventional approach to industrial pollution control is to establish laws requiring 
firms to cut emissions. Voluntary regulation, by contrast, provides incentives, but not mandates, 
for pollution control. In industrialized countries, such regulation has become popular over the 
past 20 years (Morgenstern and Pizer 2007; Khoeler 2007). Environmental authorities in 
developing countries, particularly those in Latin America, also have embraced this approach. For 
example, in Colombia and Chile, dozens of voluntary agreements involving thousands of firms 
have been signed since the mid-1990s (Blackman et al. 2009; Jiménez 2007).  
Yet we know little about developing countries’ voluntary initiatives, including what 
drives participation and whether participation improves environmental performance. Rigorous 
empirical studies are rare (Blackman, In Press). This gap is significant for two reasons. First, 
voluntary regulation plays a particularly important role in developing countries. Whereas 
regulators in industrialized countries typically use it to spur overcompliance with mandatory 
regulation, those in developing countries generally use it to stem rampant noncompliance due to, 
among other factors, weak environmental management institutions and limited political will for 
strict enforcement (Blackman 2008). Second, findings from the considerable literature on 
voluntary regulation in industrialized countries may not apply to developing countries where 
voluntary policies are implemented in a different sociopolitical context and, as just noted, for 
different reasons.  
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 To help fill this gap, this article analyzes Mexico’s flagship voluntary initiative, the 
National Environmental Auditing Program (Programa Nacional de Auditoria Ambiental), also 
known as the Clean Industry Program (Programa Industria Limpia), which provides public 
recognition and a temporary inspection amnesty to plants that correct deficiencies identified by a 
third-party environmental audit. This initiative represents one of the three main types of 
voluntary tools: public programs that invite firms to meet environmental performance standards.1 
To our knowledge, ours is the first econometric analysis of the environmental impacts of such a 
policy in a developing country.2  
Although its applicability is unclear, the considerable literature on industrialized 
countries’ voluntary environmental programs certainly raises serious questions about whether 
developing countries’ voluntary programs are likely to have environmental benefits. Recent 
literature reviews and meta analyses paint a mostly pessimistic picture (Darnall and Sides 2008; 
Koehler 2007; Rivera and de Leon 2010). Individual case studies suggest that at least in some 
instances, voluntary programs have few environmental benefits because they mainly attract 
already-clean firms “free riding” on their preparticipation environmental performance (Vidovic 
and Khanna 2007; Morgenstern and Pizer 2007). Such firms have clear incentives to join 
voluntary programs: the costs are relatively low because no additional investments are required 
to meet the program’s performance targets, and the benefits, which may include positive 
publicity, subsidies, and regulatory relief, can be significant.3 
To evaluate the Clean Industry Program, we construct a unique data set by merging plant-
level registries compiled by the Mexican Ministry of Economics and the Federal Environmental 
Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente, PROFEPA), 
within the Ministry of the Environment. The econometric analysis has two stages. In the first 
stage, we use a duration model to identify the drivers of participation in the program between 
1992 and 2004. We are particularly interested in understanding whether the plants that join free-
                                                 
1 Prominent examples of U.S. voluntary programs are the Environmental Protection Agency’s 33/50 and Climate 
Wi$e programs. The two other main types of voluntary regulation are agreements negotiated between regulatory 
authorities and firms, and unilateral commitments undertaken by firms (Lyon and Maxwell 2002). 
2 Jiménez (2007) presents an econometric analysis of the impacts of negotiated voluntary agreements, not a 
voluntary public program, in Chile. Blackman and Guerrero (2010), Christmann and Taylor (2001), and Rivera 
(2002) present econometric analyses of participation in voluntary environmental programs in developing economies. 
3 The evidence for such free riding is not unequivocal, however. In some cases, relatively dirty firms and those 
under pressure from regulatory authorities are more likely to participate in voluntary programs (Gamper-Rabindran 
2006; Sam and Innes 2008; Short and Toffel 2007).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
3 
ride on their preparticipation environmental performance. Because reliable direct measures of 
environmental performance are not available, we use the incidence of PROFEPA fines as a 
proxy. Ex ante, it is not clear that fines drive participation. Even in industrialized countries with 
robust regulatory pressure, the links between environmental performance, regulatory fines, and 
participation in voluntary programs are tentative (Arora and Cason 1996; Gamper-Rabindran 
2006). In Mexico, where the regulatory pressure is generally weaker because of a lack of 
manpower, expertise, and political will (OECD 2003; Gilbreath 2003; Brizzi and Ahmed 2001), 
one might reasonably expect these links to be even more uncertain. 
In the second stage of our analysis, we use propensity score matching to measure the 
impact of the Clean Industry Program on participants’ environmental performance; that is, we 
compare the average performance of a sample of participants with that of a matched sample of 
nonparticipants. Here, too, we use the incidence of PROFEPA fines as a proxy for environmental 
performance. We rely on the duration model estimated in the first stage to generate propensity 
scores.  
Our first-stage duration analysis indicates that plants recently fined by PROFEPA were 
more likely to join the Clean Industry Program, all other things equal. However, the second-stage 
matching analysis shows that after graduating from the program, participants were not fined at a 
substantially lower rate than nonparticipants. These results suggest that although the program 
attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators, it did not have a large, lasting impact on 
their environmental performance. 
2. Background 
Launched in 1992, the Clean Industry Program is one of the three pillars of PROFEPA’s 
enforcement strategy, along with inspections and citizen complaints. Plants volunteering to join 
the program pay for a environmental audit by an accredited third-party inspector. The audit 
assesses both the plant’s compliance with all relevant environmental regulations (including those 
for which regulators other than PROFEPA are responsible) and its adherence to international 
environmental management best practices not covered by regulations.4 Following the audit, the 
                                                 
4 PROFEPA is responsible for enforcing hazardous waste, air pollution, and natural resource regulations, including 
for forestry and fisheries (OECD 2003). The National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, CNA) is 
charged with enforcing water quality regulation. Local governments also have some enforcement powers over water 
pollution and solid waste. In practice, the division of responsibilities among PROFEPA, CNA, and local 
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plant negotiates an action plan with PROFEPA wherein it agrees to correct all deficiencies 
identified in the audit by an agreed-upon deadline, which for most plants is more than two years 
after the audit.5 PROFEPA, in exchange, agrees not to penalize the plant while these 
improvements are being made. If the plant fulfills all the terms of its action plan, PROFEPA 
awards it a Clean Industry Certificate that is valid for two years. These certificates are commonly 
used in domestic and international marketing campaigns and are considered a major benefit of 
participation (Alvarez-Larraurri and Fogel 2008; Harvard University 2000). In addition, 
PROFEPA agrees not to inspect the plant for two years except in the event of an industrial 
accident or public complaint. When the Clean Industry Certificate expires, the plant must repeat 
the auditing process to be recertified. Hence, like many voluntary initiatives, the Clean Industry 
Program provides both carrots and sticks to encourage participation.  
Participation in the Clean Industry Program grew from 78 plants in 1992 to 7,616 plants 
in 2008 (PROFEPA 2009). For most of the 1990s, the Clean Industry Program focused on 
recruiting large often publicly owned plants in sectors that PROFEPA classified as “at risk” for 
industrial accidents, such as cement, chemicals, electronics, oil refining, and pharmaceuticals. In 
2001, the program’s mandate was changed from mitigating industrial risk to environmental 
protection, and as a result, more nonmanufacturing facilities began to participate. PROFEPA also 
has intensified efforts to attract small and medium enterprises (Alvarez-Larraurri and Fogel 
2008). Figure 1 shows participation by sector and year between 1992 and 2004 for the sample of 
543 Clean Industry participants included in our empirical analysis.6 It reflects major trends for 
the population of participants during this period (Alvarez-Larraurro and Fogel 2008): a dip in 
participation rates in the mid-1990s followed by a steep rise in 2003 and 2004, and increasing 
participation by plants in sectors other than manufacturing and construction following the change 
in the program’s mandate in 2001.7 Geographically, participants in our regression sample were 
                                                                                                                                                             
governments has been somewhat confused and contentious, particularly in the first years after PROFEPA’s creation 
in 1992 (Blackman and Sisto 2006; Gilbreath 2003).  
5 According to Harvard University (2000, 5) “It is important to note that Mexico’s voluntary audit program is much 
more than a system for verifying compliance ... In many instances, international standards and ‘best practices’ guide 
the auditors recommendations and PROFEPA’s negotiated agreement with the facilities.”  
6 The selection of the sample is discussed in Section 3.1. 
7 The dip in participation in the 1990s was partly due to an economic crisis and partly due to problems with the 
program’s design and administration, which were addressed by subsequent administrative reforms. These problems 
included confusion about terms of reference for audits, their high costs, and overall lack of transparency (Alvarez-
Larraurri and Fogel 2008; Harvard University 2000). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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fairly diverse. Every state has participants, and only three contain more than 6% of the sample: 
Chihuahua (11%), Mexico (10%), and Jalisco (7%).  
 
Figure 1. Within-Sample Participation in  









































3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data  
Official census data on Mexican plants are not available. We constructed a plant-level 
data set from four sources. The first is the July 2004 System of Mexican Business Information 
(Sistema de Información Empresarial Mexicano, SIEM). The Ministry of Economics compiles 
and maintains SIEM and uses it to promote Mexican commerce. By law, all private sector plants 
are required to provide basic data to SIEM. The database is constantly updated to include new 
entrants and omit plants that have exited the market. It is not time specific; that is, it does not 
indicate when plants provided their data to SIEM or whether this information subsequently 
changed. The data include geographic location, sector, gross sales, equity, and whether the Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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facility exports, imports, and is a government supplier. Our SIEM data contain 528,618 records. 
However, to limit our subsample of nonparticipating facilities to those types of plants that had a 
history of participating in the Clean Industry Program, we dropped all plants in sectors (defined 
by North American Industrial Classification Codes) that were not also represented in the 
PROFEPA Clean Industry database. This step eliminated approximately 80% of the plants in the 
SIEM data, mostly small-scale retail operations.8  
The second data source is a PROFEPA registry of facilities that had participated in the 
Clean Industry Program through September 2004. The registry includes plant name, location, 
and year of participation, among other variables, for 2,749 plants. Of these, we dropped all 759 
state-owned plants, for two reasons. On a practical level, they cannot be matched with the SIEM 
data, which are restricted to private plants. Also, the behavior of state and private plants is likely 
to differ.  
Our third data source is a 2009 registry of fines levied by PROFEPA. It contains records 
of every PROFEPA fine between January 1992 and December 2009, including the date and 
amount of the fine. It has data on 44,008 plants.  
Our final data source set is a 2007 list of all 3,850 Mexican maquiladoras obtained from 
a commercial registry (Mexico’s Maquila Online Directory 2007). Designed to take advantage of 
relatively inexpensive Mexican labor, maquiladoras are foreign-owned assembly plants that 
import inputs and export outputs without paying tariffs or duties.  
Because these four sources do not have common numerical codes identifying individual 
plants, we merged them by nonnumerical identifiers—plant name, state, and municipio 
(county).9 These nonnumeric data did not uniquely identify plants. For example, in the SIEM 
data, multiple records have the same plant name, state, and municipio. To avoid incorrectly 
matching records, we dropped all records that were not uniquely identified. This resulted in a 
loss of 5 to 20% of the records in each data set. The end result was a sample of 114,406 plants, of 
which 543 participated in the Clean Industry program and 113,863 did not.  
 
                                                 
8 This adjustment changes the question addressed by our first-stage participation model from, “for all private sector 
Mexican plants, what plant characteristics drive participation?” to, “for all private sector Mexican plants in sectors 
with at least one Clean Industry participant, what plant characteristics drive participation?” 
9 Using finer geographical identifiers (e.g., city) proved to be impractical because of a lack of uniformity across the 
databases. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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3.2. Independent Variables  
3.2.1. Time-Varying Independent Variables: Fines  
As discussed in the introduction, of the potential drivers of participation in the Clean 
Industry Program we are particularly interested in environmental performance and the 
consequent threat of regulatory fines. As a proxy, we construct a time-since-last-fine variable, 
which is the only time-varying independent variable in our first-stage model. We discuss how 
this variable enters into the model in Section 4.2, below. Here, we briefly present summary 
statistics on PROFEPA fines between 1992 and 2009 (Table 1). PROFEPA issued 4,288 fines 
during this period. In our entire sample of 114,406 plants, 1.9% were fined. Of the 2,215 plants 
that were fined, the average number of fines was 1.9 per plant, and the average fine was 122,916 
pesos (approximately US$12,000).  
Table 1. PROFEPA Fines, 1992–2009 
 
Sample Î 
   Ð 
 
 
Clean Industry  
participants + 
nonparticipants 




All plants     (n = 114,406)  (n = 543)  (n = 113,863) 
  Fined   1.94%  26.34%  1.82% 
Fined plants    (n =2,215)  (n =143)  (n = 2,072) 
  Total no. fines  4,288  309  3,979 
  Average no. fines/plant  1.94  2.16  1.92 
 
Table 1 shows that the percentage of Clean Industry participants fined (26.3%) was far 
higher than the percentage for nonparticipants (1.8%). Hence, there appears to be a simple 
positive correlation between incidence of fines and participation in the program. However, this 
correlation does not necessarily imply causation, for at least two reasons. First, it may have been 
generated by underlying differences in plant characteristics. For example, it could simply reflect 
a tendency for large plants to be fined and also to participate in the program. Second, it does not 
take into account the intertemporal relationship between fines and participation. For example, it 
lumps together cases in which a fine was followed by participation one year later and cases in 
which a fine was followed by participation ten years later, even though the former are more 
likely to represent actual causation. Our econometric model addresses both of these issues: it 
controls for a variety of underlying plant characteristics and takes into account the intertemporal 
relationship between fines and participation.  
 Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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3.2.2. Time-Invariant Independent Variables  
Table 2 lists the time-invariant independent variables in the first-stage participation 
model and presents sample means for participants and nonparticipants. Because our main focus 
is the impact of past fines on participation and, in turn, the impact of participation on future 
fines, these variables serve mainly as controls for plant characteristics. Three dummy variables 
identify plants that export their products, import their inputs, and sell their products to the 
Mexican government. Two sets of dummy variables—on sales and capitalization—measure plant 
size.10 Seventeen dichotomous dummy variables identify the plants’ economic activity.11 Finally, 
30 dummy variables identify the federal entity (state or delegation) where each plant is located.  
Table 2. Time-Invariant Regressors and Sample Means
a 
Variables  




(n = 543) 
CI  
nonparticipants 
(n = 113,863) 
Exporter 0.547  0.072 
Importer 0.621  0.111 
Government supplier  0.175  0.063 
Maquiladora  0.123 0.006 
Gross revenue     
0–3 million pesos  0.254  0.881 
3–12 million pesos  0.111  0.054 
12 million pesos plus  0.635  0.065 
Accounting capital     
0–0.9 million pesos  0.260  0.846 
0.9–5 million pesos  0.133  0.075 
5 million pesos plus  0.608  0.079 
a
Table excludes 14 sector and 28 state dummy variables.  
                                                 
10 The SIEM data do not include the actual values of sales or capital for each plant, only ranges of these variables 
into which the actual values fall.  
11 The sector dummy variables are (1) agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting; (2) commercial wholesale; 
(3) commercial retail; (4) construction; (5) electricity, water, gas; (6) industrial manufacturing; (7) information, mass 
media; (8) mining; (9) other services except government activities; (10) temporary lodging, food, beverage 
preparation; (11) waste management and remediation; (12) entertainment, culture, sports; (13) health, social 
assistance; (15) real estate services; (16) professional, scientific, technical; (17) transport, mail, services. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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4. Participation Model 
4.1. Empirical Strategy: Duration Analysis 
We use a duration model to estimate a hazard rate—the conditional probability that a 
plant in our data set joins the Clean Industry Program at time t, given that it has not already 
joined and given its characteristics at time t.12 We use a duration model for two reasons. First, it 
explicitly accounts for the intertemporal relationship between fines and participation, which, as 
discussed above, helps determine whether fines actually cause participation. Second, it avoids 
the problem of right censoring that would arise in a cross-sectional dichotomous choice model if 
some plants that were not participating in September 2004 (when our participation panel ends) 
subsequently joined the program. A duration approach circumvents this problem by estimating 
the conditional probability of participation in each period. We use a Cox (1975) proportional 
hazard model because it does not require parametric assumptions about the time-dependence of 
the probability density function. We use years as our temporal unit of analysis. Although we 
know the day on which plants were fined, we know only the year in which plants joined the 
program.13 Finally, note that although plants can and do participate in the Clean Industry 
Program more than once, our duration model seeks to explain the decision to participate for the 
first time. As is standard practice with duration models, observations (here, plants) are dropped 
from the regression sample after their first “failure” (here, participation).  
4.2. Modeling Fines 
We use an eight-year third-order polynomial to fit the relationship over time between a 
fine and the probability of joining the Clean Industry Program. After eight years have passed, we 
assume the effect of the fine is constant (and likely zero). We therefore include three fine 
variables in the model: the number of years since the most recent fine (TF), the square of that 
number (TF^2), and the cube of that number (TF^3). All these variables are set equal to zero if 
                                                 
12 For an introduction, see Kiefer (1998). 
13 Our use of years as a temporal unit of analysis raises questions about whether time aggregation bias is a problem, 
and whether a discrete-time representation might be more appropriate. In general, time aggregation bias is a problem 
only when hazard rates are high and/or the periods of measurement are long—that is, when a large number of failure 
events in a given interval erode the underlying population of units at risk of failure (Petersen 1991). This is not the 
case in our sample: the number of plants joining the program in any given year is always quite small relative to the 
number of nonparticipating plants. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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the most recent fine occurred more than eight years earlier or if a fine never occurred. We also 
include a dichotomous dummy variable set equal to one if the plant was ever fined at any time 
prior to the current period (TFP). This dummy variable picks up the permanent effect of ever 
having been fined, while the three other fine variables pick up the transient effect of a recent 
fine. Together, the estimated coefficients for the four fine variables map out the effect on the 
conditional probability of joining the program (hazard rate) as a function of the time since the 
most recent fine.14  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Time-Varying Independent Variable: Fines  
Because our duration model is nonlinear, estimated coefficients do not have a simple 
interpretation. Exponentiated coefficients, however, can be interpreted as the hazard ratio—that 
is, the ratio of the hazard rate given an increase in an explanatory variable at time t (a unit 
increase for a continuous variable or a change from 0 to 1 for a dichotomous dummy variable) 
relative to the baseline hazard rate at time t. A hazard ratio greater than 1 indicates that an 
increase in the explanatory variable increases the hazard rate relative to the baseline. For 
example, a hazard ratio of 2 means that an increase in the explanatory variable doubles the 
hazard rate relative to the baseline. 
In our model, the hazard ratio for time-since-last-fine is given by 




2 ^ TF TF TFP β + β + β + β = . 
Figure 2 is a graph of this “response function” polynomial along with 95% confidence 
intervals. The hazard ratio, HR(t), is positive and significantly different from unity (where unity 
implies no difference from the baseline hazard rate without a fine) for t between 1 and 4. This 
indicates that a PROFEPA fine raised the probability that a plant would join the program for four 
years following the fine. To be more specific, when t = 1, the estimated hazard ratio is 3.2. This 
means that a PROFEPA fine within the past year increases the conditional probability of joining 
the program by a factor of 3.2. Figure 2 shows that, on average, a fine roughly triples the 
probability of joining the program for four years after the fine.  
                                                 
14 We experimented with using dummy variables instead of a third-order polynomial to capture the relationship 
between fines and participation. This approach yields the same qualitative results. We chose to use a third-order 
polynomial because it generates the intuitive response function depicted in Figure 2. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Figure 2. Hazard Ratio (Hazard Rate with/without Fine) for Probability  
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A potential concern about our analysis is that fines variables could, in principle, be 
endogenous if they are correlated with unobserved plant characteristics that affect participation.15 
Although such endogeneity cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely to be driving the observed 
correlation between fines and participation, since endogeneity would generate a response that did 
not change over time, rather than a response that diminishes in magnitude (Figure 2).16  
                                                 
15 For example, aside from our sector dummies, our covariates do not include a precise measure of the complexity 
of the production process, so complexity is partly unobserved. It could be that complex plants are more likely to be 
fined because they have a higher potential for violating environmental regulations and are also more likely to 
participate in the program because they tend to employ educated and sophisticated managers. If this were actually 
true, then fines would be endogenous. 
16 Intraclass correlation is a second potential concern. Some plants in our regression sample are owned by the same 
firm. Presumably, in some cases, the decision to participate is made at the firm level. But in other cases, it is clearly 
made at the plant level—some plants owned by the same firm do not make the same participation decision. In cases 
where the participation decision is made at the firm level, our data may exhibit intraclass correlation. Ideally, we 
would correct for this correlation using clustered standard errors. However, we are not able to do that for two 
reasons. First, we cannot reliably identify cases where the participation decision is made at the firm versus the plant 
level. Second, our indicator of common ownership is unreliable. The only data we can use to determine whether 
plants share a common owner is their names. But in some cases, plants with different names are owned by the same 
parent firm. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Hence, the results summarized in Figure 2 suggest a causal relationship between fines 
and participation in the program. In particular, the fact that the positive and significant effect of 
fines on the hazard ratio diminishes over time suggests that fines drive participation. 
4.3.2. Time-Invariant Independent Variables  
Table 3 presents regression results for the time-invariant regressors. Hazard ratios for the 
exporter, importer, and government supplier dummy variables are all positive and significant at 
the 1% level. They indicate that plants selling their goods in overseas markets were 1.8 times 
more likely to participate in the Clean Industry Program, those importing foreign inputs were 1.7 
times more likely, and those selling products to government were 1.4 times more likely. The 
hazard ratio for the maquiladora dummy is not significant. 
Table 3. Regression Results for Cox Proportional Hazard Model of  
Participation in Clean Industry Program, 1992–2004 (n = 114,406); 
Time-Invariant Regressors
a 
Variable Hazard  Ratio  S.E. 
Exporter 1.823***  0.252 
Importer 1.738***  0.254 
Government supplier  1.370***  0.170 
Maquiladora  1.175 0.184 
Gross revenue     
3–12 million pesos  2.225***  0.402 
12 million pesos plus  4.102***  0.672 
Accounting capital     
0.9–5 million pesos  1.966***  0.330 
5 million pesos plus  3.144***  0.486 
Log likelihood   -5201.771   
aModel includes 14 sector dummy variables, 28 state dummy 
variables, and 4 fines variables, which are omitted from the table. 
See Figure 2 for fines variables results. 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
Hazard ratios for the sales and capital dummies suggest that larger plants were more 
likely to participate. Hazard ratios for the sales dummies indicate that compared with plants with 
less than 3 million pesos in sales (the reference group), those with 3 million to 12 million pesos 
in sales were 2.2 times more likely to participate, and those with more than 12 million pesos in 
sales were 4.1 times more likely. Similarly, hazard ratios for the capitalization dummies indicate 
that compared with plants with less than 0.9 million pesos in capital, those with 0.9 million to 5 
million pesos in capital were 2.0 times more likely to participate, and those with more than 5 
million pesos in capital were 3.1 times more likely.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
13 
For the sector fixed effects, the reference sector is educational services. Compared with 
plants in this sector, those in mass media were less likely to join and those in mining were more 
likely to join. For the state fixed effects, the reference states are Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, 
and Colima. Compared with plants in these states, those in Mexico City were less likely to 
participate, and those in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Morelos, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas 
were more likely.  
5. Impact Model 
5.1. Empirical Strategy: Propensity Score Matching 
Analyzing the Clean Industry Program’s impact on participants’ environmental 
performance is challenging for two reasons. First, reasonably accurate, direct measurements of 
plants’ environmental performance (such as data on emissions of air and water pollutants) are 
unavailable. As a proxy, we again use our PROFEPA fines data—specifically, the average 
number of fines assessed per year after the inspection amnesty ends. As long as dirty plants are 
fined more, and more often, than clean ones, these averages will be negatively correlated with 
environmental performance.  
The second challenge is a general problem in evaluating a program’s impact on a 
performance indicator (Rubin 1974; Holland 1986). Ideally, impact would be measured by 
comparing each agent’s performance with program participation and without it. However, we 
never actually observe both. In practice, therefore, program impact is often measured by 
comparing the average performance of participants with that of a matched control sample of 
nonparticipants that have very similar observable characteristics. The average performance of the 
matched sample proxies for the unobserved counterfactual—what participants performance 
would have been had they not participated. Matching controls for nonrandom selection into the 
program (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Ferraro et al. 2007; List et al. 2003; Dehejia and Wahba 
2002). 
Specifically, our measure of the impact of the Clean Industry Program—the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT)—is the difference between the average number of fines per 
year incurred by participants and by a matched sample of nonparticipants during an outcome 
period that depends on the timing of participation. For each matched set of plants, the first year 
of this period is the eighth year after the participant joined the Clean Industry Program (i.e., was 
audited) and the last year is 2009, the last full year of our fines panel. As discussed below, the 
eight-year lag controls for the inspection amnesty granted to participants.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Creating matched sets of plants with the exact same observed characteristics is 
challenging because the characteristics are numerous. However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
demonstrate that we need match plants only on the basis of their propensity score—that is, their 
likelihood of participation as predicted by a regression model. We use the duration model of 
program participation presented above to generate propensity scores for each participating and 
nonparticipating plant in our sample for each year.17 We match participants with nonparticipants 
using propensity scores for the year the former joined the program.  
A complication in calculating ATT as the difference between average number of 
postparticipation fines assessed per year for participants and for a matched sample of 
nonparticipants is that, as discussed in Section 2, participants are granted an inspection amnesty 
(barring a citizen complaint or industrial accident) that begins when the audit is performed, 
remains in place while the plant corrects deficiencies identified in the audit, and ends two years 
after a Clean Industry Certificate is awarded. The median length of the entire amnesty period in 
our sample is three years and the maximum is ten years. To avoid biasing downward our 
estimate of participants’ postparticipation average annual incidence of fines, we must ensure that 
the outcome period over which we calculate the average starts after the inspection amnesty ends. 
We do that by defining the first year of the outcome period as the eighth year after the audit and 
dropping from the matching analysis all (five) participants whose amnesty lasted more than 
seven years. This strategy effectively eliminates from our matching sample all plants that joined 
the program after 2001, since their outcome period would begin in 2010, and the last year in our 
fines panel is 2009.18 Hence, our matching analysis includes only participants that joined the 
Clean Industry Program from 1992 to 2001, its first nine years. Our treatment sample consists of 
344 Clean Industry participants. As discussed below, our control sample consists of 344 or more 
nonparticipants, depending on the matching method used. On average, the 344 participants in our 
matching sample were fined 0.027 times per year during the outcome period.  
                                                 
17 Other program evaluations in which the timing of program participation plays an important role have relied on 
duration models to generate propensity scores. See, for example, Brodaty et al. (2001), Sianesi (2004), and Pizer et 
al. (2008). 
18 For example, for all participants that were audited in 1994, and for matched nonparticipants, the outcome period 
is 2002 through 2009. To make matching computationally feasible, the outcome period must start the same number 
of years after the audit for all plants in the sample. We chose a lag of eight years because it results in the largest 
matching sample. Our qualitative results are robust to different assumptions about the length of the lag.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Various methods are available to match participants and nonparticipants based on 
propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008; Morgan and Harding 2006). To ensure 
robustness, we report results from five: (i) nearest neighbor 1-to-1 matching, wherein each 
participant is matched to the nonparticipant with the closest propensity score; (ii) nearest 
neighbor 1-to-4 matching, wherein each participant is matched to the four nonparticipants with 
the closest propensity scores and the counterfactual outcome is the average across these four; (iii) 
nearest neighbor 1-to-8 matching; (iv) nearest neighbor 1-to-16 matching; and (v) kernel 
matching, wherein a weighted average of outcomes of all nonparticipating plants is used to 
construct the counterfactual outcome. For all models we enforce a common support and allow 
matching with replacement.  
We performed balance tests for the five matching estimators. None achieved balance (a 
statistically insignificant difference in covariate means for participants and matched 
nonparticipants) for 100% of the covariates, which is not surprising given that our participation 
model includes 50 covariates. However, on the whole, the models balanced covariates 
reasonably well. Table 4 reports median standardized bias—Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) 
balance statistic—across all covariates for each matching estimator.19 The highest median 
standardized bias is 4.61% for the nearest neighbor 1-to-4 estimator, and the lowest is 2.93% for 
the nearest neighbor 1-to-16 estimator (Table 4, middle column). Although a clear threshold for 
acceptable balance does not exist, according to Caliendo and Kopeining (2008), standardized 
bias below 3% to 5% is generally viewed as sufficient.  
Table 4. Matching Quality: Median Standardized Bias (SB)
a  
After Matching for Five Propensity Score Matching Methods (%)
b  
Method SB 
no exact  
matching 
SB 
exact matching  
on prior fines 
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  4.107  3.966 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  4.616  3.536 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  4.265  3.130 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  3.339  3.846 
(v) Kernel  2.929  2.518 
aFor a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the difference of the sample means in the participant and 
nonparticipant subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the average of sample 
variances in both groups. We report the median SB for all covariates. 
bMedian SB before matching is 17.475%. 
 
                                                 
19 Standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the participant and nonparticipant subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Because the fines covariates are likely to be particularly important in explaining 
subsequent fines during the outcome period, in a second set of models, we enforce exact 
matching on a dummy variable indicating whether the plant had been fined by PROFEPA prior 
to the outcome period. Hence, these models ensure that participants that were fined before the 
outcome period are matched with nonparticipants that also were fined before this period, and 
vice versa. Median standardized bias for the exact matching models ranges from 3.97% to 2.52% 
(Table 4, last column).  
Calculating standard errors for ATT is not straightforward because they should, in 
principle, account for the fact that propensity scores are estimated and for the imputation of the 
common support (Heckman et al. 1998). Therefore, we bootstrap standard errors using 500 
replications.  
5.2. Results 
Table 5 presents ATT estimates. They fail to reject the null hypothesis that the Clean 
Industry Program did not improve environmental performance (ATT ≥ 0).20 For all ten matching 
models—including five models without exact matching on prior fines and five with exact 
matching—ATT is not significantly different than zero. That is, in each model, there is not a 
statistically significant difference between the average annual postamnesty incidence of fines for 
participants and matched nonparticipants.  
Table 5. Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) Estimates;  
Average Annual Incidence of Fines 
  No exact matching  Exact matching on prior fines 
Propensity score matching method  ATT  S.E.
a ATT  S.E.
a
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.004  0.010  -0.003  0.011 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.006  0.007  0.004  0.007 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.006  0.007  0.004  0.007 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.007 
(v) Kernel  0.004  0.007  0.002  0.007 
aStandard errors computed using bootstrap with 500 repetitions.  
                                                 
20 Recall ATT is the average annual rate of fines during the outcome period for participants minus the average rate 
for nonparticipants, so ATT ≥ 0 indicates participants are fined at the same, or higher, rate than nonparticipants. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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5.3. Caveats 
Although the results from the matching analysis suggest that the Clean Industry Program 
did not have a lasting effect on environmental performance, three caveats are in order. First, the 
limited number of observations and variability in our outcome data bound the precision of our 
hypothesis test. As a result, we cannot infer that the Clean Industry Program did not reduce at all 
the rate at which participants were subsequently fined, only that it did reduce it by a large 
amount. Specifically, we can reject the hypothesis that the program reduced this fine rate by 
more than 46% (ATT ≤ 46% of participants’ postamnesty fine rate).21  
Second, as noted above, our matching sample includes plants that joined in the first nine 
years of the program, mostly before the year 2001 reforms (discussed in Section 2) that shifted 
the program’s focus from industrial safety to environmental management and aimed to improve 
program functioning. Were the requisite data available, an analysis of a more recent cohort of 
participants might generate a different conclusion. 
Third, ATT could be biased upward (i.e., no benefit from participation) if regulatory 
monitoring that leads to fines was more stringent for participants than for nonparticipants during 
the outcome period. If this were the case, then improvements in environmental performance due 
to participation might not be reflected in a lower incidence of PROFEPA fines, simply because 
participants were more closely inspected and therefore more frequently fined than similar 
nonparticipants. Unfortunately, the hard data on PROFEPA inspections needed to test and 
control for the stringency of monitoring are not available.22 Softer evidence is equivocal.  
                                                 
21 To see this, first note the t-score used to test hypotheses about ATT is  ( ) () C T X X C T X X t
− σ − =
 
where  T Xa n d  
C X are the mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups, the numerator therefore is the ATT, and  () C T X X − σ  is 
the standard error of ATT. If we know  T X,   () C T X X − σ , and the t-score needed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
Clean Industry Program did not reduce the rate at which participants were subsequently fined (ATT ≥ 0), which we 
will denote t*, then we can calculate 
*
C X , the mean outcome for the control group needed to reject this null 




C t X X
− σ + = . The one-sided t-score needed to reject the null at 5% given 343 degrees of 
freedom is 1.649. As noted above,  T X  is 0.027.  () C T X X − σ
 
depends on the matching model used. As a result, each 
matching model is associated with a different 
*
C X . The average for all ten matching models is 0.040. Thus, to reject 
the null hypothesis,  C X would need to be 0.040, which is 46% [(0.040-0.027)/0.027)] higher than  T X . Since  C X  
serves as our counterfactual (i.e., what the mean fine rate for participants would have been had they not 
participated), an equivalent interpretation is that participation in the Clean Industry Program would need to reduce 
the mean fine rate by at least 46%. Hence, our results allow us to reject any hypothesis that Clean Industry program 
reduced participants’ incidence of fines by more than 46%.  
22 An earlier version of this paper used inspection data in a duration model of program participation. However, these 
data included only inspections that identified a regulatory violation, not inspections that did not turn up violations. 
Such inspections are highly correlated with fines. Not surprisingly, the duration results are qualitatively equivalent 
to those from the fines model. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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On one hand, some anecdotal evidence suggests that participants were monitored more 
closely than nonparticipants during the outcome period. As noted in Section 2, when 
participants’ Clean Industry Certificates expire after two years, they can get “recertified” by 
commissioning a new third-party audit, negotiating a new action plan with PROFEPA, and 
submitting to a new follow-up PROFEPA inspection. Recertified plants may have been subjected 
to relatively stringent monitoring during the recertification process: Clean Industry audits cover 
regulatory and extraregulatory standards for air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste, 
whereas normal PROFEPA inspections typically focus on regulatory standards for the one or two 
pollution issues most prevalent in the plant’s economic sector (Barrera 2009; Ortiz 2009).  
But an argument can also be made that monitoring for participants was less stringent than 
for nonparticipants during the outcome period. Recertified plants were granted an inspection 
amnesty (barring a citizen complaint or industrial accident) lasting from their second audit until 
two years after their second Clean Industry Certificate was awarded. Presumably, monitoring 
during this period was minimal. Also, PROFEPA may have “rewarded” successful graduates of 
the Clean Industry Program with less stringent monitoring just as participants in the 
U.S.Environmental Protection Agency’s voluntary audit program are rewarded with relaxed 
oversight (Toffel and Short 2008; Stafford 2007).  
6. Conclusion 
We have used data on some 114,000 industrial facilities and other businesses in Mexico 
to evaluate the Clean Industry Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory program. The 
first stage of our analysis focused on identifying the drivers of participation in the program, and 
the second stage focused on determining whether it improves participants’ environmental 
performance.  
To analyze participation, we used a duration model because it explicitly accounts for the 
timing of the dependent variable (participation) and the main independent variable of interest 
(fines) and because it controls for right censoring. Our results suggest that regulatory fines do 
motivate participation in the program: a fine roughly triples the probability of participation for 
three years after it is assessed. Hence, the Clean Industry Program does not simply consist of 
already-clean plants. Rather, it has attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators. The 
analysis also shows that certain types of plants—those that sell their goods in overseas markets 
and to government suppliers, use imported inputs, are large, and are in certain sectors and 
states—are more likely to participate.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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To analyze program impacts, we used the postamnesty incidence of fines as a proxy for 
plants’ environmental performance and used propensity score matching to control for bias 
created by self-selection into the program of plants with characteristics likely to affect 
environmental performance. To control for the lengthy inspection amnesty granted to 
participating plants, we focused on plants that joined the program in its first nine years. Our 
analysis indicates that after their inspection amnesty expired, Clean Industry participants were 
not fined at a substantially lower rate than matched nonparticipants. This suggest that the Clean 
Industry Program did not have a large, lasting impact on average environmental performance. It 
is important to reiterate that we used a proxy for environmental performance instead of a direct 
measure, and we relied on a restricted sample of participants from the program’s first nine years. 
Nevertheless, we believe our results are credible and shed important light on the environmental 
benefits of an increasingly popular yet little-studied regulatory policy in developing countries.  
Our findings raise two questions. The first concerns the relationship between the results 
from our participation and impact analyses: if Clean Industry Program participants included dirty 
firms under pressure from regulators, and if program participants obtained certificates attesting 
that they had remedied all deficiencies identified by a comprehensive independent environmental 
audit, then why were program graduates not cleaner on average than similar nonparticipants? 
The most likely explanation is simply that the effect of the Clean Industry Program on graduates’ 
environmental performance was temporary, not permanent. After receiving their Clean Industry 
Certificates, at least some plants reverted to pre-participation levels of environmental 
performance. This explanation is consistent with evidence that the effect on participants’ 
environmental performance of U.S. voluntary (climate and energy efficiency) programs was 
temporary, lasting just two to three years after participation (Pizer et al. 2008).  
A second question concerns our participation analysis: how could regulatory pressure 
have driven participation in the Clean Industry Program if such pressure is reputed to have been 
relatively weak during our participation study period (1992–2004) (OECD 2003; Gilbreath 2003; 
Brizzi and Ahmed 2001)? We believe the explanation has partly to do with PROFEPA’s 
enforcement strategy. For most of our study period, PROFEPA targeted facilities “at risk” of 
industrial accidents—that is, large facilities in particularly dirty sectors (DOF 1990, 1992; 
Quezada 2005). Our duration analysis shows that these same plants were particularly likely to 
participate in the Clean Industry Program. Therefore, although PROFEPA monitoring and 
enforcement may have been weak for the average facility, for targeted sectors, it was less so. The 
design features of the Clean Industry Program may also explain how even weak regulatory Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
20 
pressure may have spurred participation. The program provides carrots—namely certification 
and an inspection amnesty—that helped leverage PROFEPA’s enforcement sticks. 
Finally, we note that the main findings from our participation and impact analyses are 
broadly consistent with research on voluntary programs in industrialized countries. Like many 
studies of government led-voluntary programs, we find that dirty firms under pressure from 
regulators are more likely to participate, and like most such studies, we find that participation 
does not significantly improve average environmental performance (Koehler 2007; Lyon and 
Maxwell 2008). Our findings raise questions about the ability of voluntary programs to help 
shore up weak mandatory regimes in developing countries.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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